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1. Introduction 
1 In the neoliberal  era,  as  elsewhere in Canada and so-called developed countries,  the
labour  markets  in  Quebec  have  undergone  a  structural  transformation.  It  is  now
characterized by hyper-competitiveness, the weakening of social protection measures, an
increased difficulty for workers to organize collectively and technological shifts that
impact the quantity and quality of jobs available (Drache et al., 2015). In this brave new
world of work (Beck, 2000), clear boundaries between the firm and its surroundings are
disappearing and a centrifugation dynamic is propelling jobs towards highly segmented,
casualized and precarious peripheral labour markets (Durand, 2004; Noiseux, 2014). In
this context, the emergence of the gig economy has come to embody one of the most
iconic  avatars  of  this  dynamic  of  flexibilization,  codification1 and  deskilling  through
platform-based precarious working arrangements (Lehdonvirta, 2016). Before its upsurge,
as candidly stated by the founder of a Crowdflower which is known as one of the world’s
biggest platforms of micro-task outsourcing: “[I] t was very difficult to find someone, sit them
down for ten minutes and get them to work for you, and then fire them after those ten minutes. But
with technology, you can actually find them, pay them a tiny amount of money and then get rid of
them after you don’t need them anymore” (Marvit, 2014).
2 That being said, the type of employment relationship and labour market dynamic in the
gig economy is not entirely new. The use of subcontractors, temping agencies and/or
independent (or so-called independent) work has been on the rise for at least 40 years in
Quebec (D’Amours, 2006). The term “gig” itself has long been used by musicians, while its
deleterious  implications  regarding  job  conditions  and  collective  organization  were
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already being discussed as early as 1906 (Commons, 1906). In this sense, the questions and
issues raised in the scientific literature on self-employment and non-standard/atypical
work  (Bernier  et  al.  2003;  Chaykowsky,  2005;  Cranford  et  al.,  2005; D’Amours,  2009;
Noiseux, 2014) are thus pertinent when we attempt to contemplate the gig economy. In
addition to the obvious contention around the “tiny amount of  money” as  a  central
feature associated with gig work, and more broadly around the application of minimum
labor standards;   the issues of  capital-planned workers’  atomization (Bourdieu,  1998),
crumbling job security (Standing,  2011),  maladapted social  security schemes (Boucher
and Noiseux, 2018) and difficulties regarding collective organization (Silver, 2003; Fine,
2006; Milkman, 2014) in late capitalism are also well discussed. The precariat (Standing,
2011) and the expansion of the working poor contingent (Shipler, 2005; Ulysse, 2006) thus
existed  before  the  birth  of  the  so-called  sharing  economy  based  on  the  app-driven
crowdsourcing of precarious gig-jobs. On the other hand, new debates are coming to the
fore  about  working  arrangements’  specificities  in  the  gig  economy.  The  increasingly
shorter  duration  of  contracts  on  which  the  gig  economy  is  reliant  has  reached
unprecedented limits: zero-hours contracts (Freedland et al., 2015). This might account to
the time taken to travel from Point A to Point B for Uber drivers or the time spent on a “
human  intelligence  task”  for  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk  workers.  The  algorithmic
disciplining (Aneesh, 2009), not new in itself but promoted as the main management tool
in the gig economy, leads to new forms of domination using behavioural science to push
alienation into new territories (Scheiber,  2017).  We may also wonder how these new
forms of employment are blurring the boundary between work and leisure, or between
labour and “playbor” (Cherry and Aloisi, 2017), thus transforming the very meaning we
give to work (Ferrer Connil,  2017).  Finally,  even if  this is far from exhausting all  the
questions raised, one may wonder what the impacts of a gig economy are, in which the
worker no longer only sells his labour. He/she is requested to grant the application the
right to freely exploit the productive force of his/her personal assets (car, phone, bike,
empty room or even rented apartments). This is not to undermine the worker’s alienation
from their own data produced during their working hours and then captured, processed,
codified and generated as a new commodity owned by the platform organization. In the
case of Uber, workers’ data, until now, represents a key input in the rationalization of the
overall production process and critical for their market dominance. The latter has been
the subject of an increasing amount of research works (both conceptual and empirical)
aiming at  understanding the determinants of  its  organizational  model  as  well  as  the
capitalist mode of value production (Srnicek 2017; Tucker 2017). Other works investigated
the daily working conditions of the drivers (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016; Wells and al.,
2017),  the algorithmic management (Lee M. and al.,  2015;  Mohlmann and Zalamnson,
2017)  and  the  drivers’  reclassifications  as  “partners”  (Prassl  and  Risak,  2016;
Cherry 2016). 
3 In this paper, which presents the results of an ongoing ethnography of Uber drivers in
Montreal and builds on the extensive literature on the gig economy; we draw on Jean-
Pierre  Durand’s  “job  centrifugation  dynamic”  (2004)  conceptual  framework and offer  a
critique of Uber’s business model, which promises “good money” and claims to create a “
flexible” and “no-boss” work environment. We intend at deconstructing the Uber narrative
by  exposing  its  central  features  (precarity,  market  control  scheduling  and  app-
subordination)  which  structures  drivers’  daily  work  routines.  This  will  allow  us  to
reconsider the Uber model, not so much as a new trend, but mainly as an accentuation of
the job centrifugation dynamic,  which exacerbates  its  deleterious effect  on earnings,
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social protection, job security and the ability to control the labour process. The article is
structured around four parts. Following this introduction, the second section outlines the
methodological  choices  used  in  the  fieldwork.  The  third  section  provides  a
contextualization of the Uber model of organization within the history of labour market
fragmentation, the fissuring of workplaces and the centrifugation of the worker towards
peripheral labour markets. It also provides a snapshot on the precarity of the working
poor in Quebec. The fourth section will be detailing our findings. 
 
2. Methodology 
4 The  results  presented  in  this  article  proceed  from  an  ongoing  ethnographic  work
conducted in relation to Uber-drivers, which began in the summer of 20162. Following a
series  of  six  preliminary  semi-structured  interviews  with  drivers  operating  in  the
Province of Quebec3, we grasped the need to acquire a more in-depth understanding of
the relational context embedded within the Uber model4. These interviews inquired about
the employment history of the drivers, their motives to operate on the Uber platform
before  it  was  legalized,  their  revenues,  the  inter-drivers’  dynamics  as  well  as  their
interactions with the app.  This exploratory phase was critical  to familiarize with the
drivers’ community and developing our initial understanding of their daily challenges as
uncertified drivers isolated behind the wheels. Also, it helped us capture key elements of
the relation between drivers and the app (i.e., eligibility, acceptance rate, the five-star
evaluation system, price surging mechanisms, etc.). Accordingly, we prioritized two main
strategies to gather our empirical material: in-car discussion and netnography. The in-
car-discussion methodological choice was inspired by the work of researchers associated
with the Dynamo project (Salehi et al., 2015)5. Adapting it to our case, we decided to use
Uber’s services as a rider. This allowed us to observe and interact with drivers in situ,
without causing any disruption of their daily routine. Moreover, it helped us to learn
more  about  the  drivers’  demographics,  their  employment  history,  their  motives  and
working hours, and their perception regarding the app. To the best of our knowledge, this
is  the  first  academic  research  project  that  uses  such  an  approach – the  in-car
discussions – as part of a comprehensive data collection protocol.
5 Our thorough and comprehensive observations of an online web-based forum were made
in line with Kozinets’ (2002)6 study of online communities. His research methods were
framed under the practices of “netnography”, or “ethnography on the Internet”, which is a “
qualitative research methodology that adapts ethnographic research techniques to the study of
cultures  and  communities  emerging  through  computer-mediated  communications”  (Kozinets,
2002: 2)7. The online observations provided us with first-hand knowledge about the inter-
drivers’ interactions and their perception of collegial solidarity. As in the case of Salehi et
al.  (2015),  the online observations allowed us to capture the volatility of the relation
between workers and the considerable risk of friction, as one driver told us, between
“competitive colleagues”. It also informed us of drivers’  adaptive strategies to ensure
better working conditions.  Furthermore,  it  gave us access to hundreds of  discussions
threads regarding almost every aspect of the Uber model. We were able to observe and
analyse screenshots taken from their app and addressing issues such as daily and weekly
revenues, price surging, promotions, driver ratings and fare cancellations. 
6 The main phase of our fieldwork started in July 2017 and lasted until March 2018. Uber’s
business operations in Quebec having been regulated, it facilitated drivers’ recruitment
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and allowed them to interact more freely on online forums8. We were able to conduct a
series  of  65 in-car  discussions  with  drivers  in  Quebec  (Montreal,  Montérégie  and
Gatineau). These discussions allowed us to observe (in-situ) and analyse an important part
of the drivers’ labour process and their interaction with both the riders and the app. We
adopted active measures to ensure a diversified set of trips. To this end, we conducted
trips during different periods of the day (early morning, peak time, end of the business
day,  evening  and midnight)  on both weekdays  and weekends.  We also  balanced our
investigation  between  short  and  long  trips  moving  between  urban  centres  and  the
suburbs9. On several occasions, we used different riders’ accounts in order to strengthen
drivers’ anonymity (i.e., they cannot be technically tracked back by following one rider
account).  As  per  our  ethical  protocol,  all  drivers  were  informed about  our  research
objectives  and  identity  as  academic  researchers  from  the  first  moment  of  our
conversations.  In a  few cases,  drivers  expressed their  discomfort  or  unwillingness to
proceed with the discussion. This taught us that being in the position of a rider with the
ability to note the driver’s performance represented a power imbalance. As a result, we
chose to conduct what we called “silent trips” where we did not initiate discussions with
the drivers, which allowed them to frame the communicational context10. Throughout the
in-car-discussions,  we  learned  about  drivers’  employment  history,  their  cultural
background,  period of  active  service  on the platform,  their  daily  challenges  and the
tactics they are developing to adapt to the market. Moreover, we explored their untold
ways to plan for their driving experiences, the investments they are making in the cars
and their positioning vis-à-vis the application and the passengers. 
7 At the same time, we also conducted a thorough and prolonged “digital immersion” into
the largest public Facebook pages for Uber drivers in Montreal and Quebec City. As of
April 2018, more than 2,500 members11 and 100 very active core participants who post
and participate in discussion were observed. Overall, more than 100 threads, englobing
hundreds of comments/pictures/screenshots, were reviewed, interpreted and helped us
acquire  a  first-hand understanding  the  inter-drivers’  dynamics  and  daily  challenges.
Throughout our observations, we undertook measures to abide by the ethics of carrying
out research online,  whereby researchers must  acknowledge that,  even though these
groups are open to the public, participants (drivers in our case) may not be fully aware of
the implications of this situation12. 
 
3. Contextualization and theorization 
3.1 The 2008 crisis and the emergence of the gig economy
8 From Taylorian factory labour to gig work, capitalism has been consistently adapting its
organizational setups to safeguard its profit margins despite a series of global crises.
Following  the  great  recession  of  2007-8,  we  have  witnessed  a  new  cycle  in  the
reorganization of work relations through the emergence of several global entities, such as
Uber (2008), Airbnb (2008)13, TaskRabbit (2008)14, Deliveroo (2013)15 and Foodora (2014)16.
These new players share two common features: they all use the Internet infrastructure to
match “demand and supply of work and services at an extremely high speed” (DeStephano,
2015) within local markets, and they all reclassify workers as independent contractors
(Prassl and Risak, 2015). As a result, the already growing non-standard/atypical working
arrangements have registered new categories of  employment with no guarantee of  a
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stable  income,  nor  access  to  social  protection.  Elert  and  Henerkson  assessed  the
transformation induced by an organization such as Uber. They propose the approach of
an “evasive entrepreneurship”, which is a “profit-driven business activity in the market that
introduces  Schumpeterian  technological  or  organizational  innovations  in  order  to  evade  the
existing institutional framework” (2016: 10). Uber is the most emblematic company of this
emerging gig economy and has since grown exponentially to dominate the global market
for local transportation. In the U.S., their active drivers increased from below 50,000 in
January 2013 to 464,681 drivers by December 2015 (Hall & Krueger, 2016). Hence, one
third of those drivers kept on actively “ubering” for the next two years while only 11%
went inactive after one month (ibid: 18). Today, the application accounts for 75 million
riders  and 3 million drivers  (Uber,  online17).  They completed 4 billion trips  (by 2017)
across more than 600 cities in 63 countries, averaging 15 million trips per day or 143 trips
per second (ibid).  Moreover, the organization managed to raise more than 21.5 billion
USD in 21 rounds of funding and its market value reached 62 billion USD while registering
around 2.4 billion USD as profit in the first quarter of 2018 (Crunchbase, online)18. 
9 In  October  2014,  Uber  launched  its  service  in  Montreal,  followed  by  Quebec  City  in
February 2015, and in both Laval and Longueuil a few months later. For two years, the
company operated illegally, and hundreds of drivers were progressively fined by the local
authorities19. As of March 2016, the Uber fleet in the Province of Quebec relied on more
than 3,500 drivers (Roy, 2016). In June 2016, the Assemblée Nationale du Quebec (National
Assembly  of  Quebec)  enacted the  Act  to  Amend  Various  Legislative  Provisions  Respecting
Mainly  Transportation  Services  by  Taxi  (Bill 100)20.  The  new regulation was  designed to
accommodate the Uber model and legalized services such as UberX and Uberpool, as well
as their drivers’ rating system, the data collection mechanism and dynamic pricing (also
known as “price surging”). Moreover, the Taxi Industry Advisory Panel was abolished,
which gave the relevant ministry the right to solely authorize pilot projects that “may
have different standards and rules than those prescribed by the laws or regulations under the
Minister’s administration” (Bill 100: 3). Following its implementation, Quebec’s government
and Uber signed an agreement21 (September 2016) overseeing the company’s operations
and allowing it to operate for 50,000 hours per week, calculated as an equivalent of 300
taxi licences22. As for the drivers, the agreement, labelled as a pilot project,acknowledged
their  classification  as  “driver-partners”  by  Uber  (without  providing  any  further
clarification) and obliged them to acquire a class 4C taxi driving permit. Nevertheless,
Uber drivers were not allowed to provide transportation services outside the medium of
the app (paragraph 39). In other words, they were certified by the government to work
exclusively for Uber23. In discussing the regulation of Uber in Quebec, Susan Bissom-Rapp
and Urwana Coiquaud stated that the province had delegated its “law-making power to the
entity it aims to regulate” (2017: 10). For them, this is in line with a series of regulations
intending at downgrading the labour protection and fueling the proliferation of grey
zones in work relations. The current case of Uber drivers’ in Quebec echoes the situation
faced  by  the  workers,  mainly  women,  providing  home  childcare  (RSGs)  who  were
classified as entrepreneurs in 2003 and for a time excluded from the right of unionization,
social and legal protection under the labour laws (ibid: 9). In both cases, the government’s
preferences  opted  for  a  classification  which  prioritizes  the  commercial  contractual
relations over the standard employment relations.
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3.2 The gig economy as an extension of the job centrifugation
dynamic in the post-Fordist era
10 In the mid-20th century, observing the striking flaws of laissez-faire capitalism, most of
the so-called developed countries adopted a Keynesian framework and chose to set full
employment  as  the  main  objective  guiding  an  interventionist  economic  policy.  The
concept of “Fordist wages relations” was developed to describe the regulation mode in
this regime and designed around a central character: the factory worker working full-
time on a permanent contract, earning a stable, growing income, which was sufficient to
provide  for  the  entire  family.  The social  protection system was  simultaneously  built
around the same character. As it is now fully acknowledged, this framework was to be
challenged during the transition into the neo-liberal regime of the early 1980s. Under this
new regime, where labour was viewed as just another commodity, which should compete
between each other and be subjected to market forces,  greater labour flexibility and
reduced social protections were praised as the new leitmotifs. In these conditions, the “
Platform capitalism” (Srnicek N.,  2017),  as argued by Eric Tucker (2017),  appeared as a
response to the socioeconomic transformations which declined the standard employment
relationship  and  fueled  the  “growth  of  precarious  work,  including  own-account  self-
employment and temporary work”. 
11 To take  stock  of  the  deepening  fragmentation  of  labour  markets  under  these  new
circumstances,  rather  than  turning  to  the  classic  dichotomies  between  primary  and
secondary markets (Wilkinson, 1981), internal and external job markets (Reve, 1990) and
between formal and informal work (Lewis, 1979); the “job centrifugation dynamic” concept
(see Figure 1), inspired by Atkinson’s research (1985) on the flexible firm was developed
by  Durand  to  characterize  the  new  era.  In  short,  “recent  developments  in  the
employment system seem to imply that the centre-periphery paradigm now works on
several levels”, and that “the issue of outsourcing, temporary work (…), the self-employed
(…) that had traditionally been attributed to the periphery, is now harboured in the heart
of the production systems” (2004: 186). 
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12 For  the  author,  the  dynamic  of  job  centrifugation  pushing  employment  towards
peripheral  labour  markets  results  in  a  breakdown of  working  conditions,  while  still
conserving the ability of central firms to control and direct the labour process. Within the
new context, lower wages and restricted access to social protection and fringe benefits
are associated with working conditions that are constantly eroded by the proliferation of
different employment statuses. By enhancing competition among workers and directly
targeting  group solidarity,  this  labour  transformation has  also  enacted  a  “methodical
destruction of the collective” (Bourdieu, 1998). Such reasoning bridges with the most recent
reflexions on platform capitalism by David Weill and Tanya Goldman (2016) who argue
that the current transformation induced by the digital technologies are “part of a much
broader context of profound changes that have and will continue to transform the workplace for
millions of workers”. In this perspective they assume that many of those organizations are
using the technological edge, namely the algorithmic organization of the labour process,
to deepen the fissuring of workplaces24. In the same line, Nick Srnicek (2017: 76) describes
electronic platforms as a model  of  “hyper-outsourced” organizations whereby workers,
fixed capital, maintenance and training are outsourced. In the case of Uber, we argue, the
workers’ centrifugation is further accentuated so individual drivers are being classified as
“partners” rather than subcontractors. During the London litigation process, in the case
of drivers Aslam Y. and Farrar J., the legal representative of Uber referred to the company
in London as a “mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by a common platform”25. This explicit
tendency  towards  promoting  the  drivers-Uber  relation  as  mere  commercial  relation
between “partners” is more likely, we believe, to be an imposed franchising, which is one
of  the features of  a  fissured workplace as  argued by David Weill  (2014).  As a  result,
individual drivers are pushed to an unbalanced partnership in which multibillions global
corporate is exploiting their living labour force and their “petty capital” as argued by Eric
Tucker (2016) in his investigation of the Uber case in Toronto. 
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13 In these conditions, the gig economy in general, and Uber’s gig job model in particular,
can be inserted within the job centrifugation dynamic.  In the USA,  it  is  functionally
responding to the flourishing so-called “1099 economy”26, whereas self-employment and
independent contracting are being increasingly recognized as the norm for gaining access
to the job market27.  While specific statistics on the gig economy are not available in
Canada (nor in Quebec); we do know that the country, according to the OECD, has the
highest rate of low-paid workers, a situation now affecting one quarter of workers and
illustrating a long-term trend, which started in the mid-1970s (Larochelle and Coté, 2009).
Even  though  the  proportion  of  non-standard  employment  in  total  employment  has
stabilized in the last 10 years; it should be clearly stated that atypical jobs have become a
central feature of Canadian labour markets: less than half of the country’s workers had a
standard employment relation in 2013 (PEPSO, 2015: 10)28. As for Quebec, the share of
people with atypical employment29 (all forms combined) in total employment increased
drastically from 16.7% in 1976 to almost 40% in 2015 (Matte et al., 1998; ISQ, 2017). Self-
employed workers (without paid assistants) represented a significant share of the overall
so-called “independent workers” (374,400 out of 540,000 workers,  Cloutier-Villeneuve,
2014). This last category was singled out as the most frequent category of the atypical
work in the period between 2011 and 2013 as the share of independent workers with paid
assistants lost five points while the full-time temporary jobs increased by 4 points in the
period between 1997/99 and 2011/13.  This explicitly shows that the landscape of the
atypical  work  in  Quebec  has  been  increasingly  shifting  towards  less  entrepreneurial
features and normalization of insecure jobs. In the same line, workers’ remuneration may
represent another feature of impoverished labour market in Quebec. Available data shows
that around 23% of workers (of which 60% are women) are earning less than $15 per
hours (half of them are earning less than $12). 
14 In  short,  as  elsewhere  in  the  Western  world,  Quebec’s  job  system  has  undergone
fundamental changes over the last 40 years. Two complementary phenomena stand out: a
decline in permanent, stable, full-time employment and an increase in the number of
non-standard workers. The new productive “combinatoire” has introduced a centrifugal
movement of jobs towards peripheral markets, while the proliferation of employment
statuses has led to increasing numbers of jobs that are poorly paid, offer only partial
eligibility  for  private  benefits,  and  provide  limited  access  to  public  benefits,  union
representation and collective bargaining(Noiseux, 2014). Furthermore, these upheavals in
the job market have a greater impact on specific categories of individuals according to
class, ethnicity, age (Noiseux, 2012), and sex (Crespo, 2009; Noiseux, 2011). As we will see
further on in Section 2, the Uber gig work model clearly fits within this framework.
 
3.3 The gig economy as an expression of state-enabled,
competition-driven neoliberalism 
15 The transformations of the labour markets in advanced capitalism, as presented in the
last section, is neither random nor the effect of laissez-faire policies. Rather, they are the
result of decisions made by states consistently guided by the principle of competition
(Dardot and Laval, 2009). To put it bluntly, the state plays a crucial role in provoking
competition between workers located at the bottom of labour markets, such that these
decisions affect the employment and living conditions of the working poor engaged in the
gig  economy.  As  we  have  shown  elsewhere,  while  the  trend  has  been  towards  the
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widening of the welfare state in Quebec and Canada in the decades following the Second
World War, the economic setbacks of the late 1970s bolstered the adoption of neo-liberal
policies. Through the transformation of unemployment insurance and social assistance
programs (realigned around the workfare model), but also by refusing to adapt labour
laws to the differentiated needs of the increasingly numerous atypical workers; the state
engaged in a planned remodelling of labour markets fostered by a Friedmanian-type of
interventionism aiming  at  increasing  competition  between  workers,  and  the  pool  of
workers, at the rough end of the labour markets (Boucher and Noiseux, 2018). The end
result,  40  years  later,  is  a  labour  market  that  is,  more  than  ever,  characterized  by
employment status-based segmentation30, precariousness and the inequality of access to
social and labour rights protections.
16 The Uber case clearly highlights the central role played by the state in catalysing the
centrifugation dynamic. On the one hand, after allowing Uber to enter the market and to
operate at the regulatory margins for over two years, and therefore enabling it to shape a
new “grey zone of employment” (Azais, 2015); Quebec’s government has, as we have seen,
recently legalized its operations in the province, while creating a new employment status,
labelled as “driver-partner”, which is nowhere to be found in the labour laws. Although it
is certainly too soon to clearly understand the consequences and the full significance of
this  new  status,  it  can  already  be  stated  that  it  could  correlate  with  the  driver’s
inadmissibility to most labour-protection schemes inherited from the Fordist era. It will
also  most  probably  restrict  drivers’  ability  to  organize  collectively31.  Regarding  the
catalysing role of the state, and a substantial amount of driver’s background encountered
during our fieldwork fit  this  narrative (cf.  3.1),  it  can also be said that  the multiple
remodelling of unemployment insurance and social assistance programs over the years
has laid the foundations for the growth of the gig economy. In other words, by restricting
access to unemployment insurance32 and by “activating” social assistance in the direction
of the workfare model, the state has left behind an important pool of distressed workers,
who can now be mobilized under the gig economy model. 
 
4. Deconstructing the Uber Model, Evidence from the
Field 
17 The Uber story, as stated across its main webpage33, headlines the creation of possibilities
for “riders, drivers and cities” as the company ultimate objective. It confirms that the app is
in fact “changing the logistical fabric of cities around the world” and defines its mission as
making “transportation as  reliable  as  running water”,  so “everyone benefits” including its
drivers who can find in Uber “a new flexible way to earn money”. This last assertion was
explicitly placed upfront by David Plouffe, former Uber chief adviser and board members,
who identified Uber as critically helping individuals overcome the challenges of wage
stagnation,  work-life  balance,  underemployment  and student  loans (Uber  Newsroom,
2015). He further claimed that Uber “can quite literally help transport people out of poverty,
offering people affordable rides whenever, wherever they need one” (ibid). He also underlined
that Uber is “simply asking cities to allow their citizens to use their personal assets – their cars – 
to make money by driving their fellow citizens around their city” (ibid).  The company also
refers to available data showing that, “in London, nearly a third of driver partners live in areas
where unemployment rates are highest” (Uber, 2018, online34). These assertions are also in
line  with  Plouffe’s  claims  that,  “[i]n  France,  25  percent  of  our  over  10,000  drivers  were
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unemployed before driving with Uber, and around 40 percent of those had been out of work for
more than a year” (Uber Newsroom, 201535).  In sum, as a self-proclaimed working-class
saviour, Uber has been promoting a model of work relations based on the promise of
liberating  workers  from hardship,  inflexibility  at  work  and  the  ongoing  disciplining
practices  in  conventional  work  settings.  This  overpromised  freedom  of  work  is
overlooking the fact that a significant number of those workers would not be in need to
get engaged in “microtasking” in a healthy economy with an adequate supply of good
jobs (Srnicek, 2017: 82). The table below presents the threefold Uber marketing package
being sold to drivers as the pillars of workers’ emancipatory path. 
18 In the following, we contest the “Uber story” and critically expose how this business
model is accentuating work precarity and workers’ subordination rather than boosting
their autonomy and flexibility. To this end, this section will  be subdivided into three
parts, which will directly respond to the three pillars of the Uber model, as we identified
throughout their main promotional campaign. 
 
4.1 A diverse community of car owners “making good money”?
19 In August 2017, Uber launched a new promotional campaign highlighting the stories of
five  Montreal  drivers36.  The  campaign  framed  the  Uber  driving  experience  as  civic
engagement, which was aimed at inducing social change rather than as a work activity, in
which workers provide a paid service. It portrayed drivers as agents of change, using
some of their driving experience to gain support for social causes, such as fighting child
hunger in Africa, or act as ambassadors of their city while socializing with tourists’ riders.
The campaign magnified the stories of two female drivers, drawing attention to their
status as mothers, who benefit from their driving work as a way to pursue their studies,
while taking care of their children. In this first section, addressing and going beyond the
“make good money” assertion as shown in table 1,  we investigate the validity of this
rhetoric by answering three interconnected questions. 
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4.1.1 Social entrepreneurs or working poor car “owners”?
20 Our first interviewed driver, Andrew37, was a long-term unemployed man in his mid-40s
with a university degree in cultural  studies and unable to make ends meet with the
insufficient monthly welfare assistance. He presented himself as a libertarian who wished
to be involved in an emerging technology that would change the way of doing business
and saw Uber as a way to get in touch with others interested in innovative technologies.
Another driver, Steve, in his early-20s and with a hearing impairment, viewed his driving
experience as an opportunity to be productive despite being labelled as “unfit for work”
and excluded from several  jobs,  including taxi  driving.  When first  interviewed,  both
drivers, who still received social assistance while ubering, attested to have managed to
have somehow improve their revenues through the app. However, their stories reveal
more about their adaptive strategies to ensure a decent income in a difficult context. Not
only did Andrew state that he had to use his credit card limit to purchase an eligible car – 
a “2006” – at a time when he used to live one hour outside the vicinity of Montreal where
Uber was still  operating illegally,  but,  as shown below, he also had to make extreme
decisions to be able to break with his prolonged unemployment status.
21 “As a result, I didn’t sleep very well, because if Uber was not successful then I would have
this car that I couldn’t pay for, and my credit card had no more margin… By the end of
March 2015, I started “ubering”. It was working, I started having clients (…) But the thing
is I live (…) an hour outside Montreal (…) outside of Uber territory. I brought a rolled-up
mattress, which I put it in the back of my car, and I slept in my car [in a public building],
they had underground parking there. My car is long, so I could sleep (…) Because it was
winter time, so I would sleep in my car, and then in the morning I would go to Starbucks
to clean my face, have a coffee, and then I would do Uber. That is how it began for me (…)
And that’s what I was doing in March, April and May of 2015.”
22 Similarly, Steve’s strategy to overcome his five years of unemployment and the dozens of
rejected jobs applications was centred on his driving experience with Uber. For more
than one year, he was illegally driving despite being harassed on several occasions by the
taxi “cowboys”38 and being fined by the Bureau du Taxi in Montreal. Hence, as a strategy
to increase his income, he used to drive as a full-timer and casually rented his car to
other drivers. At the time of our first interview, he was driving for eight hours per day
and leasing his two cars, for other drivers with hearing impairments, around the clock at
a rate of CAD 30 per eight-hour shift when he was not working.
23 One year later, we interviewed both drivers to track the impact of the Uber regulation on
their work conditions. Andrew was now further away from his self-identification as a
libertarian entrepreneur or a “free spirit”. He was on his way to join “Téo Taxi”, a new
electric taxi company hiring full-time drivers with a fixed salary and paid overtime. As
for Steve, he was recovering from a work accident that he had had while working in a
workshop where he had found a job after stopping “ubering”. He kept on with his side
business of subleasing cars but emphasized the significant amount of time and money he
was paying for the maintenance of the cars39. Their stories can be added to the many
other testimonies that we gathered during the 65 in-car discussions and the prolonged
online observations  we conducted between July  2017 and March 2018.  In one of  the
discussions, Emmanuel, a self-employed mechanic and father of two, who is originally
from Haiti, summed up his situation by stating that, for him, Uber is not only an option.
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Rather,  it  is  a “must” when he is short of cash and has to do the grocery shopping.
Similarly, some of the student drivers also identify their driving work as a “must” in
order to reduce their debt burden without being exposed to discriminatory practices and
rigid work conditions in conventional on-call jobs. 
24 Overall, our findings reveal that the drivers’ community is overpopulated with workers
already engaged in precarious work relations and who are deferring to Uber as a way to
make ends meet40. Far from being motivated by “social entrepreneurship”, driving for
Uber is more likely to be a key adaptive strategy used by the working poor in their quest
for a living wage. That being said, this narrative clearly points to a landscape where Uber
is, as it claims while not using this language, effectively exploiting a fragmented labour
market while “helping” precarious workers to increase their revenue in the context of
deteriorating remuneration levels and increasingly restricted access to insufficient social
protection allowances. Our findings bridge with those outlined through the work of a
group of researchers who investigated the work lives of Uber drivers in Washington, D.C.
(Wells and al., 2017) as their research also revealed that drivers were trapped in a “debt-
to-work  pipeline”  with  significant  financial  risks  while  struggling  to  cope  with  the
company’s self-regulations and “near total control over what really matters for drivers”. 
 
4.1.2 Everybody is Ubering? 
25 As for the “diversity” of  Uber-drivers,  it  clearly does not  exist  when we look at  the
situation through a gender lens. In the course of nine months of almost daily use of Uber
services,  we  failed  to  encounter  more  than two female  drivers  out  of  the  65  in-car
discussion we had. The first encounter with a female driver came after more than two
months  and  through  a  female  passenger  profile41.  In  common  with  gender-based
diversity, the ethnic heterogeneity of the drivers’ community is very slim. By March 2018,
when we concluded our fieldwork, it was clear that we had been sat behind a reserved
army of declassed male migrants. Out of the 65 in-car-discussions we had, fewer than five
non-migrant drivers (or drivers not belonging to visible minorities). Instead, what we had
seen in front of us was an overconcentration of migrants from the Middle East and North
Africa,  followed  by  drivers  from Haitian  backgrounds42.  To  a  significant  extent,  this
mirrors the ethnic structure of the taxi driver community in Montreal, as underlined by
Saiid,  a Montreal  driver who used to work as a taxi driver and had joined the Uber
network two years ago. Saiid labels ubering as a “migrants’ job”43. This situation seems to
be close to what is observed elsewhere in other Western cities. In the case of London,
available data released by Transport for London (TFL) authorities indicate that, among
migrant drivers who are holders of private hire driving licences, the majority are non-
white  migrants44.  Moreover,  Uber  had identified  the  last  decisions  of  London mayor
which  aimed  at  heralding  a  “new  era”  for  London’s  taxi  and  private  hire  trades
(ridesharing  companies)45 as  discriminating  against  their  drivers  of  whom many  are
immigrants  (Davies,  2017).  In its  released statement,  Uber identified their  Londoners
drivers as working hard “to look after themselves and their families” (ibid). Similarly, in Paris,
Uber is being seen as a key opportunity for the second generation of migrants living in
the suburbs and trapped in poverty and despair46. 
26 Emblematic of the socioeconomic backgrounds of others declassed migrant drivers, Saiid
arrived  in  Quebec  five  years  ago  as  a  skilled  migrant  with  a  university  degree  in
agronomy. He never managed to secure job interviews, although he fulfilled all technical
requirements and had already accredited his degrees. For him, migrants are pushed into
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precarious jobs due to systematic “hidden discriminatory practices”. Similarly, Kanj, a
Lebanese migrant  with more than 15 years  of  work experience in logistics,  was also
ubering as he had failed to find employment in his field of expertise. He “ubers” while
pursuing a short-term course at university, which he believes will help him increase his
chances of being offered “quality jobs”. Another driver, who recently landed, stated that
while  he  had  previously  worked  as  a  mechanical  engineer  in  charge  of  developing
automation programs for industrial production lines back home, his driving experience
with Uber represents his entry strategy into Quebec’s highly restrictive job market. One
of the two female drivers we encountered, told us that “ubering” was their (with her
spouse)  fastest  way  to  generate  revenues.  Therefore,  they  bought  a  car  and  started
driving  on  a  rotating  shift-work  system.  Rather  than  a  diversified  portrait  of  a
heterogeneous labour force, similar stories of overqualified migrants ‘ubering’ for a living
and  overcoming  economic  exclusion  were  continuously  forthcoming  during  our
fieldwork.  Encountering drivers  with degrees in engineering,  education,  sciences and
business administration was such a frequent occurrence in our fieldwork that it routinely
informed our discussions. In turn, this contributed to the saturation that we had reached
by March 2018. These drivers’ appreciation of Uber is centred around its ability to spare
them the challenges of on-call employment, which is more likely to be taken up by newly
arriving migrants, as stated by an Algerian migrant who detailed his successive work
experiences. As a father of three children, he felt uncomfortable with being under the
radar of an employer and on-call to fill the gaps in staffing during periods of extreme
weather  conditions,  weekends  and  holidays.  With  Uber,  he  had  invested  part  of  his
savings in a qualified car and started, “cashing-in”. These findings are in line with the
conclusion  of  the  recent  CIRANO  report,  which  pointed  out  to  the  professional
overqualification  among  the  immigrant  workers  in  Quebec  (Boudarbat  and
Montmarquette, 201647). 
 
4.1.3 A money machine?
27 The first thing we note at this stage of our study regarding “the money question” is that it
is clear that, in order to survive ubering, a long period of learning by trial and error must
be endured. The burden of this behind-the-wheels-on-your-own learning period is fully
borne by drivers striving for cash without fully acknowledging the implications for their
physical health and, as we will see, the depreciation of their assets resulting from their
work for Uber. As the driving experience is a highly customized economic activity, but
also because our research objectives do not intend to measure the net earnings grossed
by drivers, it is certainly risky48. Drivers’ income is the output of a combination of factors
(type  of  car,  driving  hours,  share  of  surged  trips  out  of  the  overall  accepted  rides,
maintenance cost, fiscal deduction and/or conformity, etc.). That being said, in February
2016, Christopher Nardi, a journalist with Journal de Montreal, worked as a full-time Uber
driver for a week, earning no more than CAD 4.60 per working hour after deducting all
expenses. Nardi’s gross earnings amounted to CAD 608 for 35 working hours, while his net
revenue (after deducting Uber’s share) was CAD 456.08, which is the equivalent of CAD 13
per hour.  However,  once he calculated the net expenses for driving a Toyota Corolla
(CAA) for 671 kilometres per week, his take-home earnings dropped to CAD 161, which
equated to CAD 4.6 per hour49. This dismal account echoes our empirical findings. As per
our observations in the field, this seems to close resemble a portrait of workers who do
not concentrate most of their activities on high-demand periods.
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28 On several occasions, we witnessed drivers posting screenshots and observed that the
vast  majority  showed meagre  daily  or  weekly  revenues.  These  observations  and  the
resulting debates taught us that drivers’ revenues were very irregular, to say the least.
They appear to be extremely volatile and fluctuate dramatically from one day to another,
or even during the same day, depending on what time and in which neighbourhood the
driver  “chose50”  to  Uber.  Inexperienced  drivers  lacking  functional  knowledge  of  the
market were usually those most affected by this dynamic. In some of the online posts,
drivers referred to negative earnings per hour when a driver spent more than one hour
with no trip, or when making a very long trip (over 50 minutes) for less than CAD 20. As
an example of this kind of situation, one driver posted details of one of his long trips, in
which he had to drive for 410 kilometres in four hours for CAD 187, with his net earnings
reduced to CAD 140 after deducting Uber’s share. He stated that this journey had cost him
CAD 40 in fuel. While discussing the matter with his fellow drivers, he expressed his doubt
regarding  the  profitability  of  such  long  trips,  taking  into  consideration  the  car
depreciation cost and the time lost during the empty drive back. Other drivers exclusively
target the downtown area, which means that they undertake a lot of small trips mounting
to CAD 6, although their fares can fall to CAD 4 or even less when accounting for expenses
and Uber’s share of the fare51. While we have to say that some drivers do talk about their
relatively high gross income online, they often overlook the fact that they drove close to
12 hours per day in the process. 
29 We also found that the quest for cash is pushing drivers to implement different coping
strategies. A considerable number of drivers is shifting between driving via the UberX
platform and delivering food via the Uber Eats platform. Their rationale is simple: it is
always better to cash-in rather than patrolling the streets with no clients during periods
of low demand. After all, every minute count; this is especially true for drivers seeking to
make extra money in a couple of hours per day52. Besides (and sometimes alongside) this,
some drivers have decided to make serious investment decisions to maintain their Uber
livelihoods.  Some  adopt  strategies  to  lower  their  running  costs  related  to  fuel  and
maintenance expenses by investing in certain types of cars (such as electrical cars)53.
Others are obliged to renew their car to abide by the company list of qualified models for
UberX or  UberSelect.  In  some cases,  we  encountered  drivers  who bought  their  cars
exclusively for ubering. Some used up their credit limits, while others applied for a car
loan or used their life savings to purchase a car (such as when religious restrictions
impeded them from applying for a loan and paying interests) worth up to CAD 20,000; so
that it complies with Uber’s ever-changing policies. Such capital investments, despite the
high uncertainty resulting from the fact that the Uber-license in Quebec is still,  even
today, undergoing a trial period, increases the exit cost for drivers and in turn pushes
them to introduce deeper coping strategies (long working hours, degrading their services
from UberSelect  to  UberX or  Uber  Eats)  to  ensure  higher  revenues  and survive  the
market’s ups and downs. 
30 In  sum,  even  though it  is  difficult  to  calculate  the  exact  hourly  wage  of  drivers  in
Montreal, our fieldwork can certainly attest that, even when they are multiplying the
aforementioned coping strategies, ubering is certainly not a “money machine” as claimed
by the company. Our empirical findings tend to point in the opposite direction, revealing
a business model that exploits the precarity of a largely segmented labour market, while
externalizing  an important  part  of  the  production cost  (and risk)  to  further  burden
workers.
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 4.2 Working and moonlighting extended hours whenever … the
market wants you in
31 Offering  potential  drivers  flexible  work  conditions,  thus  liberating  them  from  the
obligation of having to work fixed hours, is, following the money machine argument, the
second most important component of Uber’s rhetoric to mobilize new drivers. Moving
away from the rigidity of the Fordist model, where the machine dictates the pace (and the
labour needs),  and pretending to go beyond the post-Fordist/Toyotist  model  of  ‘lean
production’,  where workers’  schedules are adjusted to the just-in-time labour process
dictated by consumer demand, Uber’s recruitment rhetoric is focused on drivers’ own
priority by promoting the notion of complete freedom in terms of when they choose to
drive.  In the following,  again building on our observations in the field,  we critically
discuss Uber’s claim that drivers can drive whenever they have time,  ting their own
schedule and therefore be “there for all of life’s most important moments” (cf. Table 1).
32 The first  and most  important consideration when discussing the issue of  freedom to
choose is the fact that this question is somehow irrelevant for many full-timers who
spend  most  of  their  non-sleeping  time  behind  the  wheel.  As  an  example,  Rahim,  a
Montreal driver in his early 60s who is originally from Pakistan, described his daily life as
a series of work intervals, which might make up more than 65 hours per week. His work
starts as early as morning prayers and concludes late in the evening. Rahim was familiar
with other drivers working for more than 12 hours per day. He spoke about one of his
friends who used to sometimes work for more than 16 hours per day. For him as for his
friends, this situation was driven by the need to earn a certain amount of money, which
they considered sufficient54. For full-time drivers, the primary limit on their freedom to
choose their schedule is thus Uber Canada’s in-house regulation that forces active drivers
to go offline for six hours after having spent 12 hours online. This was driven by the
company attempt to “prevent drowsy driving”, despite its assertion that “most driver-
partners use the Uber app less than 10 hours a week”, according to a written statement55
written by Rob Khazzam, the company general manager in Canada56. 
 
4.2.1 Chasing market demand
33 At first glance, the expressed willingness to restore workers as free individuals (Miller
and  Rose,  1995)  is  clearly  internalized  by  the  drivers.  Almost  all  of  our  discussants
referred to the flexibility of working hours as their main motive to continue driving,
despite the significant increase in the number of drivers (and subsequent lower revenues)
patrolling the streets of the city. While this obsession with the right to choose their own
working hours can be attested among both full-time and part-time self-identified drivers
at the discursive level; more tangible information about how their work schedule is built
was gathered in the course of our fieldwork. For most of the drivers, working hours are
adapted to market dynamics, with their so-called ‘personalized’ work schedule largely
determined by consumer demand, Uber price-surge decisions. Also, the work schedule in
the first jobs, which is less likely to be controlled by part-time drivers, represents a key
determinant of the drivers working hours.
34 The driving experience differs significantly across the days of the week. During weekdays,
i.e., Monday to Thursday, most of the drivers structure their schedule so that they catch
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the peak-time intervals (mornings and end of business days). They avoid the in-between
periods as demand, in general, decreases. Accordingly, the weekday working day for the
“average” Uber driver could be subdivided into three major blocks (mornings, afternoons
and evenings).  Our findings show that  weekends (Thursday to Sunday)  are the most
desired  working  periods  for  almost  all  active  drivers.  They  represent  an  important
inducement in the drivers’ decisions about structuring their working hours. Almost all
drivers agreed that working during weekends is more lucrative, even when considering
the  increased  number  of  Uber-drivers  on  the  road57.  Though,  some  underlined  the
challenges they encounter on Fridays and Saturdays evenings (drunk passengers, fights,
etc.). Overall, in these matters, our findings show that the bulk of drivers structure their
working shifts not so much around their individual preference, but directly in line with
market demand. 
35 That being said, the “set your own schedule” promise is also considerably influenced by
the price surging tactic used by Uber to crowd in drivers and to ensure an oversupply of
labour in the market. This tactic is used mainly, but not only58,  during extraordinary
situations (snowstorms, freezing rain, extremely hot temperatures and special occasions,
such as New Year’s Eve or even during weekends). Based on a continuous assessment of
factors of demand, Uber’s algorithms assess the situation and impose a price surge on
specific geographical areas, which usually lasts for a limited period (sometimes for only a
few minutes, but it can also be maintained for more than an hour). Such a tactic is used to
retain and soldier available labour and pull inactive drivers online59. In the extract, below,
Linh  Tran  a  product  manager  at  Uber  was  explaining  how  the  company  uses  their
incentives to ‘dictate’ drivers on where to go so they ensure a good riding experience for
their riders and reliable revenues for the drivers60. 
36 “Experience of rush hours in San Francisco is extremely difficult because our riders and
drivers are constantly moving and they’re moving in different flows of traffic.  In the
morning our riders do not live in the core of the city so they’re trying to get to work and
they exist in surrounding the city right … but our drivers are probably … stuck in the
middle of the city because they’ve just dropped off the early birds. Now they want to get
out and they want to go somewhere with longer trips so they’re gonna head towards the
popular places … but we don’t want them to head over there because that just degrades
ETA (Estimated Arrival Time)… In order to help drivers, understand where to go? Our
investments include promotions or bonuses or incentives that dictate where are the best
places  to  go and  they  enable  our  drivers  understand  what  they  should  do  in  this
situation.” 
37 (Uber engineering YouTube channel, video uploaded on June 5, 2018, 07’:39” – 08’:38”) 
38 In one of our replicated trips with price surging, we had to pay double the ordinary price
because it was conducted during a snow episode. In another trip, which coincided with a
large failure of the metro network, the initial price increased fourfold, rising to 52 dollars
(CAD).  This  means  that  hundreds  of  drivers  will  then  “deliberately  choose”  to  be
channelled by an automated management mechanism towards the designated areas. The
“surge  hunt”  is  thus  a  widespread  practice  among  drivers  and  another  significant
determinant of their working schedule. Almost all drivers referred to price surging as an
important determinant of the when and where to uber. This was even the case among
those driving on an occasional basis or those who had decided to stop ubering.
39 The price surging issue is continuously highlighted and discussed on the online forum we
observed. Drivers share information about surged areas, compare notifications and most
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importantly discuss the impact of this tactic on their revenues and working hours. Some
drivers revealed on the forum that this  tactic is  manipulative and sometimes unfair.
Several  drivers  post  screenshots  of  notifications  of  price  surging  (x 2.7,  x 3.0,  x 4.0)
received even when offline, prompting then to go on the road, only to find that the surge
had  ended  before  they  reached  the  location.  Other  drivers  talked  about  receiving
notifications of high surging periods but failed to pick up any clients, even after being
more than half an hour in the designated area. This prompted some drivers to speak
about the “illusion of surging” when no actual trips were demanded by customers. We
also observed that the tactic is unevenly used by the app, as it pushes more drivers into
the market,  especially new ones61.  Similar situations were observed by Rosenblat and
Strake (2016) as their fieldwork revealed that price surging is “unreliable for drivers”. 
 
4.2.2 About moonlighters
40 When we enquired about those self-identified part-time drivers, which made up about
half of the drivers whom we met in the course of in-car discussions62, we found that some
of them worked for up to five or six hours per day. The number goes up to 12 hours
during weekends. Massoud, a full-time driver, told us about his friend: “He works in the
IT business, so after spending up to 8 hours behind the screen … he goes outside, takes his
car and drive through Uber.” Accordingly, the ceiling of 12 driving hours in order to
prevent drowsy driving is ineffective with some of the part-timers. 
41 That being said, the Uber narrative about the right to choose when you want to work has
a more grounded validity when looking more specifically at drivers identified as part-
timers.  For  student  part-time  drivers,  for  example,  Uber  represents  an  important
opportunity to earn money, while not being obligated to abide by rigid work shifts or stay
under the radar of on-call jobs, which are incompatible with their class schedule. Others,
such as Nabil, a migrant engineer and father of three children, values Uber’s flexibility as
it helps him to balance his parental role with the need to work. Hence, for Nabil, Massoud
and many drivers we encountered, ubering for a given number of hours on their way to
work or while coming back home, and even in the evening, is simply an easy way to earn
additional money. In some cases, drivers do not even perceive it as proper work63. 
42 Are the moonlighters fully free to choose their own work shifts? On one of the trips, we
encountered Clement, a French migrant in Montreal,  who was driving on a part-time
basis.  He started his  life  as  a  salesman and later  reoriented his  career to work as  a
professional self-employed interior designer. Clement asserted that he ubers in his spare
time or when in need of extra cash. Throughout the trip, he kept praising his driving
experience  as  an  important  way  to  earn  money  and  socialize  with  people  while
controlling his  working hours.  Along with his  other fellow drivers,  Clement  kept  on
emphasizing that he could log off and log on whenever he wanted. However, once we
enquired about his reasons for going online, his reply was centred on the challenges he
faces  as  a  self-employed  contractor  lacking  a  continuous  flow  of  contracts  and
experiencing revenue shortages. Later in the discussion, Clement answered our question
whether he had a choice about ubering or not on that particular day; his straightforward
reply was “maybe no, I don’t have the choice not to work today!” .Clement’s reply was
simple  and  transparent,  and  underlined  the  role  of  the  market  in  determining  his
working hours for Uber. 
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4.3 No office, no boss… the app is in charge
43 The  third  pillar  of  Uber  branding  targeting  potential  drivers’  points  towards  an
emancipatory discourse in the form of the “no office, no boss” motto promise to reduce
workers’ subordination and make them autonomous agents. Thus, ubering is not only
presented as an option that allows drivers to break free of the rigidity of fixed working
hours, as discussed in the previous section. It is also portrayed as a non-hierarchical work
experience compared to the conditions encountered in conventional work settings. In
this  last  section,  then,  we  discuss  the  claim that  drivers  are  self-managed,  boss-less
partners making their own decisions regarding when and where to drive, as well as about
whom they pick up,  and how they drive and provide services.  Again,  at  first  glance,
whether in their cars or through their online interactions, drivers are explicitly praising
the no boss aspect of their driving experience. For those drivers, Uber is freeing them
from being closely supervised or ordered. Chang, a part-time driver, provided a typical
example of those discourses about non-hierarchical work at Uber.
44 “You work for yourself, you are totally free (…) nobody forces you to do it, you don’t work
for somebody. Uber is the platform you can use to make money for yourself (…) Uber is a
free way! People do Uber because they don’t like to be controlled by others (…) everybody
wants freedom (…) doesn’t  want to be ordered (…) Uber is  freedom that’s  why more
people are taking it up.”
45 Similarly, our in-car discussions with drivers and online observations regularly focused
on the quest for personal freedom at work. As most migrant drivers were fully convinced
that discrimination would be present wherever they worked, they saw Uber as a break
from having to deal with day-to-day prejudices in the workplace. For others, ubering is a
way to operate freely and make their own decisions in order to achieve some kind of
personal autonomy. These discourses about the absence of control, total freedom and
autonomous decision-making are, however, challenged by several features of the labour
process at Uber. On this topic, it is important to state, first and foremost, that entering
the market as an Uber driver is not totally control-free and involves going through some
red-tape procedures. As we have seen, aspiring drivers not only have to be “accepted” by
Uber, but also have to fulfil all the requirements agreed between the company and the
relevant authorities, as in the case of Quebec. However, they remain not recognized as
taxi  drivers  and  thus  operating  within  the  limits  of  the  agreement  (i.e.,  exclusively
through the app). 
46 The  supervisory  role  of  Uber,  as  well  as  drivers’  subordination  to  the  company’s
decisions, is also highlighted by its authoritative (and ever-changing) decisions regarding
vehicle  models  associated  with  different  Uber  services.  Those  decisions,  outside  the
control of the so-called driver-partners, can have dramatic consequences, as we found
during our discussion with Andrew, a Montreal driver who had to change his car, so he
could continue ubering, as his original car had become outdated. As a result, he upgraded
his car for a model that would also be eligible for UberSelect as a way to increase his
potential earnings. He undertook the required procedures and managed to obtain a large
loan to purchase the new car. A couple of months later, the list was modified and the
model he bought was disqualified for UberSelect. In expressing his discomfort, Andrew
stated that he felt ‘betrayed’ by the company, with his main question being: “Why didn’t
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Uber inform drivers about the changes before they made their new investment?” His
instinctive response was: “They don’t care”.
47 Once a “partner” is on the road, driving for Uber also involves following its in-house
regulations, such as the rule limiting the driving working day. Drivers also have to follow
a number of directives (e.g., not having friends or family members in the car when online,
using video cameras,  not cancelling trips and not accepting cash)64.  Moreover,  Uber’s
“blind  ride  acceptance”  rule  oblige  drivers  to  accept  trips  without  knowing  the
destination (Rosenblat and Stark, 2015). This rule obliges drivers, in some cases, to accept
trips where they have to drive for up to 10 kilometres to pick up a client going for a trip
as short as one kilometre, as confirmed by many drivers. In one case, a driver had to drive
from Montreal to Laval to pick-up a passenger. On one of the early trips we conducted,
the nearest driver, a student, had to drive around 24 kilometres to the pick-up location
without knowing our destination. As he told us, his decision to accept the call was driven
by his willingness to maintain a high rate of acceptance65. 
48 Uber drivers may not be working from an office, but their driving app can be seen as an
extension of the company office, which follows them (and their car66) as soon as they are
online67. There may also be no boss in the cars, but the app is always there to make sure
the in-house regulations are being complied with. The app is omnipresent in the drivers’
labour process: it is used as a punch clock for initiating and terminating work shifts, as a
way  to  access  different  training  materials  and  as a  tool  to  help  manage  the  labour
process. It is also being used as the main tool to oversee the quality assurance of the
services  provided as  well  as  a  platform to  evaluate and discipline  the  drivers.  More
explicitly, the app may ask drivers to use a phone holder to avoid any risks while driving.
As shown by drivers’ screenshots of notifications, the app can ask them to ensure clients’
comfort by adapting the type of music they are playing or by asking them to engage in
friendly discussions with passengers68. Others were asked by the app to ensure that their
cars were cleaned. In some cases, drivers even stated that the app would send them a
notification, asking them to take an instant picture, which they thought was a way for
Uber to avoid the same account being used by more than one driver69.
49 In short, as we learned from our fieldwork, even if almost all the drivers we encountered
perceive the app to be a purely objective technological  tool  facilitating their  driving
experience,  it  is  certainly incarnating a very direct  supervisory role within the Uber
model. Using a multifunctional digital management tool, Uber often manages to disguise
the  supervisory  role  through  technological  innovation.  But  this  control-vanishing
technique has its limit as highlighted by Nathaniel, who labelled his condition as an Uber
driver as being like “a slave of the app”. 
 
5. Conclusion
50 It is now well acknowledged that the Uber organization circumvented taxi regulations
and opened up the transportation sector of the working poor, owners of cars, and striving
for extra income as presented by Hill (2015: 8). Relying on a “don’t ask permission ethic”,
in vogue in Silicon Valley (Kenney and Zisman, 2016), it minimized the entry cost and
very quickly crowded-in precarious workers and vulnerable unemployed Montrealers.
Later on, cohabiting with a government committed to the neo-liberalization of labour
policies,  a  new  “grey  zone  of  employment”  was  institutionalized.  This  led  to  the
legalization of a “driver-partner” status, which denies Uber drivers most of the social
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protection schemes inherited from the Fordist era. Acting as a market-driven ancillary
social  security net in a time of setbacks in social spending and wage stagnation;  our
observations point towards a business model where Uber is functionally mobilizing and,
indeed,  providing  a  key  opportunity  to  a  non-heterogeneous  precariat  comprising
declassed migrants,  who are relegated to and often constrained by peripheral  labour
markets.  This  ability  to  exploit  labour market  loopholes  is  an important  part  of  the
untold truth about Uber.
51 As we have shown, driving for Uber is not a “money machine”. Earnings are volatile and
the work involves long hours as well as the need to refine coping strategies, where the
risk is fully borne by the drivers in order to make ends meet. Even the majority of the
drivers who self-identified as part-timers are, in effect, job accumulators, driving for up
to six hours per day (and sometimes up to 10 hours on weekends). The Uber narratives
regarding flexibility are also explicitly challenged by the working conditions of drivers as
observed in our fieldwork. As we have seen, drivers are chasing periods of high demand
(and price surging) and structure their life accordingly. Henceforth, the “make your own
schedule” rhetoric is, in effect, an extension of the offline on-call employment schemes,
whereas the market remains the key determinant of workers’ schedule. Hereby, Uber
managed to exploit the “just-in-time” labour force, which Marx would have labelled as a
readily available ‘reserve army’,  waiting to be triggered by app incentives. As for the
notion of autonomous self-managed boss-less partners, it turns into an illusion once we
highlight  the  central  role  of  the  app  within  the  Uber  model.  As  a  multifunctional
structure,  it  is  explicitly  embodying a  supervisory role,  which allows for  a  thorough
monitoring of drivers’ performance, as well as acting as the main tool to enforce drivers’
disciplining. We would also like to insist that we observed a significant number of drivers
being pushed to financial hazards as they are using their savings and obtaining loans to
purchase cars. The latter are not only serving as prerequisites for drivers’ employability,
but  they also  build  up the  company profile  as  a  global  player  in  the  transportation
industry. 
52 Finally,  while  many investigations  were  driven by  the  need to  answer  the  question:
What’s  new about  Uber?  It  is  explicit  that  the  organization  main  innovation  is  the
reincarnation of the piece-wage system in context of large scale – on the global level – 
fully  automated processes  of  production.  In this  regard,  we believe Uber,  and fellow
application-based capitalist organizations are leaned to favourite the “form of wages most
in harmony with the capitalist mode of production” (Marx, [1887] in Srnicek, 2017). Hence, as
the proletarianization of the workers was triggered by the capitalists need to maximize
benefits  and  maintain  a  strict  control  over  the  production  process;  the  de-
proletarianization of work relations, as imposed by Uber, we believe, should be seen as a
deliberative strategic decision towards exploring new ways of maximizing profits and
lowering the production costs. 
53 Tucker (2017), building on the works Wallace Clement (1983), reminds us that domestic
system – or putting-out system – cohabited with the factory system in several  sectors.
Hereby,  the  Uber  model  of  physically  decentralized  application-based  employment
portrayed as autonomous, flexible and profitable is being developed on the ruins of the
model of the factory system which was, itself, built on the ruins of the domestic system
(Gorz, 1989: 18). In this context, the freeing of the workers from the boundaries and the
conditionalities of the factory systems is accompanied by an extensive centralization of
the control and the supervision over the production process through the build-up of the
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organization algorithmic/smart machines apparatus.  Today,  the application workers -
Uber drivers in our case - are subject to a twofold process of “accumulation by dispossession
” (Harvey, 2004). On the one hand, their de-proletarianization is dispossessing them from
all sorts of labour protection/benefits or bargaining power. And secondly, because drivers
are obliged to give the organization unconditional access to efficiently exploit their own
assets (cars/phones/Internet connection), they are being dispossessed from the value of
their  “dead labour” embodied in their  private properties  which are being monetized
(Kenney and Zysman, 2016), exploited and consumed as part of the Uber process of value
production.
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NOTES
1. In  his  research,  Vili  Lehdonvirta  (2016)  argues  that  Microwork  emerged  as  ways  to
“compensate  the  shortfalls  of  artificial  intelligence”.  He  explained  that  platforms  provide
employers with APIs (application programing interface) which is a “codified interface through
which the employer’s software can issue inputs to and receive outputs from the workforce as if it
was a software module”.
2. Rabih Jamil conducted the fieldwork.
3. As we initiated the research in the summer of 2016, when Uber was still operating illegally in
Montreal, reaching out to the drivers was the main challenge that we first faced. In this early
stage, we were able to conduct only six individual semi-structured interviews with drivers whom
we found through direct postings on social media platforms, such as Facebook groups and Kijiji, a
web-based  classified  ads  service.  These  interviews  were  mainly  carried  out  at  the  drivers
preferred premises and lasted from 60 to 120 minutes. Three drivers were re-interviewed one
year later to assess the changes since the new regulations were enacted in 2017. The interviews
were conducted as part  of  a  larger project  directed by Y.  Noiseux on non-standard workers’
collective  organization  processes  (see  www.practa.ca).  The  authors  would  like  to  thank
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Alexandre Legault who helped in conducting the interviews and elaborating the interviewing
process.
4. As a result, we shifted our methodological framework towards conducting ethnographically
inspired investigations aiming at deconstructing the relational context linking drivers,  riders
and the app. To this end, our fieldwork involved three objectives: 1) to capture the nature of the
relation governing the interaction between the three parties; 2) to describe the labour process
within which the drivers operated; and 3) to expose the power dynamics within the Uber gig
work model.
5. Their method included the creation of paid tasks to reach out to active workers operating on
the Mechanical  Turk,  a  micro-employment platform managed by e-commerce giant  Amazon,
without disrupting their working hours and/or affecting their daily revenues.
6. Sayarah  (2013)  carried  out  an  in-depth  review  of  research  that  used  “netnography” to
investigate online social interaction. 
7. In  the  context  of  the  platform  economy,  an  increasing  number  of  researchers  has  been
performing observations of digital interactions as a key research method within communities of
workers who are active on online labour platforms (Salehi et al., 2015; Irani and Silberman, 2013;
Graham  et  al.,  2017;  Lehdonvirta,  2016).  Similarly,  Rosenblat  and  Stark  (2015)  conducted
observations of interactions between Uber drivers on public online forums over a period of nine
months. 
8. In this context, talking publicly about their work experiences, challenges and even about the
opportunities rendered possible by the platform was a significant risk for those non-regulated
drivers who were demonized as “job stealers” by the taxi industry.
9. With the aim of understanding the dynamics of price surging and its impact on both drivers
and riders, we conducted the same routes more than once.
10. During these trips, we did not initiate discussion related to the research; nevertheless, some
useful information was provided by the drivers on their own initiative. The “in-car discussions”
stopped once we reached saturation with their empirical input.
11. As  the  group  is  open  to  all,  this  includes  non-drivers,  such  as  journalists,  students,
researchers, marketing specialists and (maybe more importantly when assessing the freedom of
speech on the page) one of Uber’s managers in Quebec. 
12. Therefore, we implemented strict measures to avoid any direct use or citing of the material
(posts, discussion threads, personalized screenshots) posted by the drivers.
13. See https://press.airbnb.com/airbnb-unveils-roadmap-to-bring-magical-travel-to-everyone/,
accessed 17 September 2018.
14. See  https:// www.recode.net/2017/9/26/16371178/leah-busque-fuel-capital-taskrabbit-sale,
accessed 17 September 2018.
15. See https://deliveroo.co.uk/about-us , accessed 17 September 2018. 
16. See  https://www.foodora.com/premium-restaurant-delivery-startup-foodora-launches-in-
berlin-and-frankfurt/, accessed 17 September 2018.
17. https://www.uber.com/en-CA/newsroom/company-info/, accessed 17 September 2018.
18. https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber#section-locked-marketplace,  accessed  17
September 2018.
19. The Bureau du Taxi in Montreal issued 580 infractions for Uber drivers in 2015, compared to
only  34  in  2014.  In  http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/pls/portal/docs/page/bur_taxi_fr/media/
documents/RAPPORT_ANNUEL_2015.pdf, accessed 16 April 2018.
20. L.Q.  2016:  22.  http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/
telecharge.php?type=5&file=2016C22A.PDF, accessed 16 April 2018.
21. To read the full text of the agreement, see http://static.lpcdn.ca/fichiers/articles/5018739/
entente-uber.pdf, accessed 16 April 2018. In September 2017, the project pilot was extended for
another year with minor amendments, mainly related to training obligations. 
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22. Moreover, the agreement set out a compensation system if this limit on hours was exceeded.
23. While the decree recognizes Uber as a taxi intermediary, it does not recognize Uber drivers as
taxi drivers.
24. “Fissuring  is  accomplished  through  a  variety  of  business  models:  subcontracting,  use  of
temporary  agencies  and  labor  brokers,  franchising,  licensing,  and  third-party  management.
Many  business  models  in  the  on-demand  sector  represent  a  deepening  fissuring  of  the
workplace,  as  technology  and  software  algorithms  enable  companies  to  further  outsource
significant proportions of the work”. See
http://www.fissuredworkplace.net/assets/Weil_Goldman.pdf , accessed 24 September 2018.
25. See  para  90  https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/aslam-and-farrar-v-
uber-employment-judgment-20161028-2.pdf , accessed 24 September 2018. 
26. This term refers to the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) form, which must be filed by whoever
pays more than USD 600 per year for a self-employed,  independent contractor or a business
owner. 
27. In a recent study, Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger estimated that “the share of workers in
alternative work arrangements in their main job increased by 5.7 percentage points (or by over
50 percent)  from 2005 to  2015”  (2016:  7).  More  shockingly,  they underlined that  “a  striking
implication of these estimates is that all of the net employment growth in the U.S. economy from
2005 to 2015 appears to have occurred in alternative work arrangements” (ibid: 7). The authors
defined alternative work arrangements  as  “temporary help agency workers,  on-call  workers,
contract workers, and independent contractors or freelancers” (ibid: 5). 
28. For  the Poverty and Employment Precarity  in Southern Ontario (PEPSO) research group,
“Employment that is secure, that provides a full range of benefits and that has a possible career
path  is  generally  viewed  as  better  employment,  and  it  is  often  referred  to  as  a  Standard
Employment Relationship”, in The Precarity Penalty research report (2015: 10).
29. Non-standard employment, as we define it, includes part-time work (less than 30 hours a
week),  temporary  work  (including  through  temping  agencies),  and  independent  or  so-called
independent self-employment. For a discussion of the definition, see Noiseux (2014).
30. This, in turn, is largely correlated with the personal characteristics of workers, such as age,
sex, migration status and ethnic origin.
31. In Quebec, workers have to be recognized as “salaried” in order to unionize, unless a labour
court decision, which can take a year in the making, recognizes their subordination.
32. Fewer than 40% of  unemployed Canadians now have access to unemployment insurance,
compared to more than 80% in the 1980s. For an in-depth analysis of this evolution, see https ://
jeanneemard.wordpress.com/2015/09/19/le-ratio-prestataireschomeurs/, accessed 4 April 2018. 
33. Uber, ’Finding the way”, https://www.uber.com/en-CA/our-story/, accessed 7 April 2018.
34. Uber,  “Shifting  expectations”,  https://www.uber.com/en-AR/helping-cities/,  accessed  7
April 2018.
35. See https://www.uber.com/newsroom/1776/ , accessed 1 October 2018
36. Uber  Canada,  “Testimonies”,  https://www.uber.com/fr-CA/blog/stories, accessed  8  April
2018.
37. In order to respect the confidentiality agreement we have with the drivers, their real names
have been changed in this paper to pseudonyms.
38. http://www.tvanouvelles.ca/2016/04/05/un-cowboy-anti-uber-sera-accuse, accessed 17 April
2018. 
39. The third driver whom we interviewed in the summer of 2016 stopped driving a few months
later as he managed to find a fixed job. For him, the driving experience was to overcome a period
of unemployment and cope with the loss of income due to the reduced unemployment allowance.
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40. Many of the drivers we encountered were previously active in the services sectors, students
trying  to  heal  their  indebtedness,  on-call  workers  or  self-employed  workers  managing  their
small & micro-businesses or working independently.
41. As with their male colleagues, they are in search of working hours with high demand and
price surging, and more importantly share the perception that they're driving work is temporary
and/or serves to supplement the income received from their “normal” job. At first, we thought
that  a  gender  preference  could  have  been  embedded  within  the  matchmaking  algorithm;
however,  further  trips  discredited  such  an  assumption.  The  gender  disparity  in  the  drivers’
community is also present throughout the online interactions as we did not manage to identify
more than 10 active female drivers among the discussions. Interestingly, we realized recently
that more women are getting involved in Uber Eats in Montreal, despite the fact that this service
is known for its very low returns and relatively difficult work conditions, especially in urban
areas.  This  points  to  a  possible  gender-based  segmentation  within  the gig  economy  labour
markets. 
42. Similarly,  on the online platform, a large majority of the drivers are actively engaged in
discussions belong to visual minorities. 
43. Almost all of these migrant drivers know at least two other members of their close family and
circle of friends who are driving for Uber. 
44. See UK Government, http://content.tfl.gov.uk/taxi-and-phv-demographic-stats.pdf, accessed
10 April 2018. Accordingly, the recent TFL decision to ban Uber from the city has been seen as
targeting migrant workers.
45. See  https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/new-era-for-londons-taxi-and-
private-hire-trades , accessed 20 September 2018.
46. See,  https://www.ft.com/content/bf3d0444-e129-11e5-9217-6ae3733a2cd1;  https://
www.lemonde.fr/emploi/article/2015/10/02/uber-une-chance-pour-l-emploi-des-jeunes-et-la-
diversite_4781549_1698637.html, accessed in 16 September 2018.
47. This study highlights that the highest probability of overqualification concerns marginalized
migrant  workers  (and members  of  visible  minorities),  even when they study in  Quebec.  The
transferability of human capital acquired in countries of origin is the main challenge. Boudarbat
and  Montmarquette  (2016)  attributed  this  issue  to  a  number  of  barriers,  such  as  language
deficiencies,  cultural  differences,  the  quality  of  education,  and  discrimination  in  the  labour
market (p. 59), concluding that overqualification is much higher among migrant skilled workers
compared to their non-migrant peers. They also showed (ibid. p. 60; cf. Table 3.14) that the rate
of  overqualification among migrants with a higher education is  double the rate among non-
migrants. 
48. Recently, the MIT-CEEPER research centre published the findings of a quantitative survey,
based on a sample of over 1,000 drivers, which estimated drivers’ revenues at USD 3.37 per hour.
Very quickly, these findings were highly criticized by Jonathan Hall, Uber’s chief economist, who
discredited the methodology used in the survey (see https://medium.com/uber-under-the-hood/
an-analysis-of-ceeprs-paper-on-the-economics-of-ride-hailing-1c8bfbf1081d,  accessed  11  April
2018). In 2015, Hall, along with Alan Krueger (cited earlier in this paper), used Uber’s raw data to
estimate drivers’ revenues at USD 19.04 per hour. MIT researcher, Stephen Zoepf, responded by
issuing a statement in which he acknowledged some discrepancies in some aspects of the study,
while  asking  for  more  transparent  sharing  of  relevant  data  by  Uber  (http://
fortune.com/2018/03/06/uber-lyft-mit-zoepf/, accessed 11 April 2018). To our knowledge, Uber
still has not responded to his request.
49. His  calculations  were  made  on  the  basis  of  CAD 0.44  per  kilometre.  http://
www.journaldemontreal.com/2016/02/05/la-face-cachee-duber, accessed 6 April 2018. 
50. The issue of “choice” will be discussed further in the following section.
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51. The Uber website states that drivers’ “payment for the trip is calculated as: ((base fare + time
rate + distance rate) * surge multiplier) – Uber fee + tolls and other fees”. In one of the short trips
we did (1.09 kilometres), we paid CAD 8.34 of which the share for the driver was only CAD 3.53,
representing  42% of  the  fare  we  paid  after  deducting  Uber’s  fees  (25%),  taxes  and  Quebec’s
operation fee. The driver’s share went up to 54% for a longer trip for which we paid CAD 23.55.
While, at this moment, we are not in position to generalize this context; we note that all the
operational costs, including the reservation fee, which is a “flat fee added to every trip that helps
support safety initiatives for riders and drivers as well as other operational costs” (as per Uber’s
website) is paid by riders. Similarly, the Quebec operation fee is a “separate variable fee that
helps to defray Uber’s regulatory operating fees set by the pilot project in Quebec” (as per Uber’s
website). 
52. These are also more likely to be inexperienced drivers, but we also observed this situation in
the case of drivers with more than one year of driving experience.
53. To be able to drive for Uber, Rahim, a driver we encountered, had to change his car and buy
the newest model. He opted for a car with a hybrid engine in order to reduces his fuel costs.
54. Most of them work on most holidays, thus “choosing” to skip festivities in order to cash-in on
important price surges on these occasions. 
55. The  full  statement  is  available  via  the  following  link,  https://www.uber.com/en-CA/
newsroom/drowsy-driving-2/, accessed 17 April 2018.
56. Our own observations clearly show that a 12-hour working day is not exceptional, but rather
a  frequent  occurrence  among  full-timers  trying  to  earn  a  decent  living  as  discussed  in  the
previous section.
57. Similarly, the online discussions often showed drivers celebrating their good earnings for
working evenings. 
58. Even if this is difficult to substantiate, it appears that Uber is using this tactic to increase the
revenue  of  drivers  when  their  pool  of  workers  is  not  sufficient,  therefore  stimulating  the
recruitment of drivers.
59. Accordingly,  this is  how a rider manages to find an Uber partner within five minutes of
waiting during such events, while it could take him/her more than an hour if using conventional
taxi services. 
60. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87s6w13604U , accessed 24 September 2018.
61. As we observed on the online forum, two drivers received slightly different surging rates for
the same period in the same location. The only difference was that the one receiving the highest
rate was a newer driver.
62. A significant number of self-identified part-time drivers are driving more than 30 hours per
week. It is important to note that we did not encounter any drivers who claimed to drive less
than 10 hours per week. 
63. During one of our in-car discussions, the non-migrant driver told us that he had decided to
start working for Uber because he was tired of watching boring television shows. It should be
stated that this type of narrative was uncommon in our experience.
64. Further  details  are  available  via  the  following  link  https://help.uber.com/
h/64904bd6-66ca-47e9-965d-324413079f5c, accessed 17 April 2018.
65. In a recent initiative, the company stated that, as part of its effort to allocate more control to
drivers  over  their  work  experience,  it  will  allow  them  to  refuse  a  maximum  of  two  trip
destinations per day. While such initiatives are making the driving experience less stressful, they
remain  an  explicit  sign  of  the  company’s  overall  supervisory  role  practised  through  its
multifunctional digital management tool embedded in the app.
66. In June 2016, Uber rolled out a new feature, allowing the app to track drivers’ performance in
the car. It was intended that this new service would help the company to improve road safety. As
a result, drivers receive “[d] aily reports about how their driving patterns compared to other
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drivers in their city – with suggestions on how to provide a smoother, safer ride; [r]eminders to
drivers of the importance of taking a break when they need it; [m] essages in the driver app
informing drivers that mounting their phone on the dashboard is safer than holding the phone in
their hands; [s] peed display in the app that alerts drivers to the speed of their vehicle”, https://
www.uber.com/newsroom/safety-on-the-road-july-2016/, accessed 17 April 2018.
67. As  for  the formal  “No office”  promise,  it  seems to  be generally  valid  as  workers  almost
entirely work from their own car. That being said, Uber drivers’ situation in this respect differs
somewhat  from workers  engaged  in  contractual  relations  with  electronic  platforms,  such  as
Mechanical  Turk,  Airbnb  and  even  TaskRabbit.  As  expressed  on  the  Uber  website,  the
recruitment process is not limited to the online sign-up; rather, it requires a physical visit to the
company  premises  to  “complete  a  background  screening.  Our  team  will  answer  all  of  your
questions and help you get ready to drive” (uber.com, accessed 15 April 2018). Moreover, the app
offers, in specific cities, the service of a prescheduled in-person appointment. As for Montreal, on
several  occasions,  we observed drivers posting requests  about the company premises and/or
helplines. This is welcomed by the company, which has established a “team of Uber experts” to
help drivers with issues related to their accounts, fares, and tips about where and when to drive.
The company’s local website encourages drivers to visit its office and meet with its experts. To a
large extent, this seems to be quite similar to the type of relations already existing between some
corporations and their salespeople (such as in the case of insurance companies) and therefore
not entirely exempted from having to deal with some “office environment”. 
68. Here is one example of an app message received by a driver regarding the professionalism of
his driving: “A rider suggested that the level of conversation in the car would have been better,
and we wanted you to know in case it helps you understand your ratings. Not every rider wants
to  talk  during  the  ride,  but  top  partners  usually  offer  a  friendly  greeting  and  keep  the
conversation respectful and polite.”
69. The driver who posted this screenshot expressed his concerns about security, as he received
it while driving on a highway and had to park on the roadside in order to take a picture of
himself in a very small amount of time.
ABSTRACTS
This article presents the results of an ongoing ethnography of Uber drivers in Montreal. It draws
on Jean-Pierre Durand’s “job centrifugation dynamic” (Duran, 2004) conceptual framework and
offers a  critique  of  Uber’s model  of  labour  organization  which  promises  “good  money”  and
claims  to  create  a  “flexible”  and  “no  boss”  work  environment.  Deconstructing  the  Uber
narrative,  it  exposes  the  central  features  -  precarity,  market  control  scheduling  and  app-
subordination - which structures drivers’ daily work routines and highlights twofold process of
“accumulation by dispossession”(Harvey, 2004). On the one hand, drivers’ de-proletarianization
is  dispossessing  them from all  sorts  of  labour  protection/benefits  or  bargaining  power.  And
secondly,  because  drivers  are  obliged  to  give  the  organization  an  unconditional  access  to
efficiently  exploit  their  own  assets  (cars/phones/Internet  connection),  they  are  being
dispossessed from the value of their “dead labour” embodied in their private properties which
are being monetized (Kenney and Zysman, 2016), exploited and consumed as part of the Uber
process of value production.
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Cet  article  présente  les  résultats  d’une  ethnographie  des  conducteurs  d’Uber  à  Montréal.  Il
s’appuie  sur  le  cadre  conceptuel  de  la  « centrifugation  de  l’emploi  vers  les  marchés
périphériques » de Jean-Pierre Durand (2004). Il propose une critique du modèle d’organisation
du  travail  qui  promet  « de  bons  revenus »  et  prétend  créer  un  environnement  de  travail
« flexible »  et  « sans  patrons ».  L’article  met  en  lumière  les  caractéristiques  essentielles  -
précarité, le contrôle du marché et la subordination à l’application - qui structurent les routines
de travail quotidiennes des conducteurs et révèlent un double processus « d’accumulation par
dépossession » (Harvey,2004. D’une part, leur déprolétarisation les dépossède de toutes sortes de
protection ou de tout pouvoir de négociation. D’autre part, comme les conducteurs sont obligés
de donner à l’entreprise un accès inconditionnel pour exploiter efficacement leurs propres actifs
(voitures/téléphones/connexion Internet), ceux-ci sont dépossédés de la valeur de leur « travail
mort » incarné dans leurs propriétés privées désormais monétisées (Kenney et Zysman, 2016),
exploitées et consommées dans le cadre du processus de production de la valeur par Uber.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Uber, application électronique, travail précaire, immigré-es, gig-économie,
organisation algorithmique
Keywords: Uber, electronic application, precarious work, migrants, gig economy, algorithmic
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